By Professor Thad Dunning
This booklet demanding situations the normal knowledge that usual source wealth promotes autocracy. Oil and different kinds of mineral wealth can advertise either authoritarianism and democracy, the publication argues, yet they accomplish that via assorted mechanisms; an realizing of those various mechanisms might help elucidate while both the authoritarian or democratic results of source wealth may be particularly powerful. Exploiting game-theoretic instruments and statistical modeling in addition to exact state case reports and drawing on fieldwork in Latin the USA and Africa, this e-book builds and checks a concept that explains political edition throughout resource-rich states. will probably be learn through students learning the political results of typical source wealth in lots of areas, in addition to through these drawn to the emergence and endurance of democratic regimes.
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Extra info for Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes
Of course, there is no claim that these are 20 22 Measuring the concept of private inequality raises important issues, as discussed in Chapter Four. The industrial capital share (in non-resource sectors) is the measure used in the cross-national empirical work in Chapter Four, where its utility as a proxy for private inequality in non-resource sectors of the economy is defended; the data come from industrial surveys conducted by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (see Ortega and Rodr´ıguez 2006; Rodrik 1999).
These examples suggest that there is a useful distinction to be drawn between rentier states in which the total economy (rather than simply the government) is relatively dependent on natural resources and those in which the degree of resource dependence is considerably lower. How is this distinction tied to the large-scale political outcomes this book seeks to explain? Casual inspection of the list of countries in the previous two paragraphs suggests that the resource-dependent countries tend to be more authoritarian than the merely resource-abundant countries.
Elites may weigh the expected costs associated with the coup itself (which may include, for instance, the likelihood of success or the probability of exile or imprisonment following an unsuccessful coup) against the anticipated costs and beneﬁts of continuing to live under a democratic regime. Many factors are likely to inﬂuence these latter costs and beneﬁts, but elites’ economic interests may often play a role. How might resource rents shape the economic costs and beneﬁts of democracy to these hypothetical coup plotters?